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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The above-entitled Appeal is from a judgment granted by the 
Second Judicial District Court, Weber County, State of Utah, in 
favor of Plaintiff/Appellee. The court has jurisdiction to hear 
this matter pursuant to U.C.A. §78-2a-3(2)(k). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court err in refusing to allow documentary 
and any other evidence concerning the Trust Deed and Deed in Lieu 
of Foreclosure? This issue was determined as a matter of law by 
the trial court and is reviewed by this Court for correctness. 
Citicorp Mortgage, Inc. v. Hardy. 834 P.2d 554, 555 (Utah 1992). 
2. Did the trial court err in refusing to allow testimony 
concerning the Trust Deed Note? This issue was determined as a 
matter of law by the trial court and is reviewed by this Court for 
correctness. Citicorp Mortgage. Inc. v. Hardy. 834 P.2d 554, 555 
(Utah 1992) . 
3. Did the trial court err in finding the Trust Deed to not 
be credible documentation of a valid encumbrance? The standard of 
review for this issue is a review of the appropriateness of the 
exercise of the trial court's discretion. Bambrough v. Bethers, 
552 P.2d 1286, 1290 (Utah 1976); Reeves v. Geigy Pharmaceutical. 
Inc. . 764 P.2d 636, 639 (Ct. App. Utah 1988). The standard for 
reviewing whether the trial court has properly exercised its 
discretion is the following: 
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[W]here the lower tribunal, acting within the scope of 
its authority, has conducted a hearing and arrived at a 
decision, the reviewing court will examine only the 
certified record; and will not interfere with matters of 
discretion or upset the action of the lower tribunal 
except upon a showing that the tribunal acted in excess 
of its authority or in a manner so clearly outside reason 
that its action must be deemed capricious and arbitrary. 
Peatross v. Bd. of Commas of Salt Lake County, 555 P.2d 281, 284 
(Utah 1976) (citations omitted). 
4. Did the trial court err in finding that the transaction 
involving the Trust Deed and Deed in Lieu of Foreclosure violated 
the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act? The standard of review for 
this issue is a review of the appropriateness of the exercise of 
the trial court's discretion. Bambrouah v. Bethers, 552 P.2d 1286, 
1290 (Utah 1976); Reeves v. Geiay Pharmaceutical, Inc., 764 P.2d 
636, 639 (Ct. App. Utah 1988). The standard for reviewing whether 
the trial court has properly exercised its discretion is the 
following: 
[W]here the lower tribunal, acting within the scope of 
its authority, has conducted a hearing and arrived at a 
decision, the reviewing court will examine only the 
certified record; and will not interfere with matters of 
discretion or upset the action of the lower tribunal 
except upon a showing that the tribunal acted in excess 
of its authority or in a manner so clearly outside reason 
that its action must be deemed capricious and arbitrary. 
Peatross v. Bd. of Commas of Salt Lake County, 555 P.2d 281, 284 
(Utah 1976) (citations omitted). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
U.C.A. 25-6-1, et. seq. See Addendum. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case, 
This is an action brought by Plaintiff/Appellee Susan White 
"White") seeking to have a certain Trust Deed executed by Western 
Railroad Builders Defined Benefit Pension Plan ("Plan"), in favor 
Defendant/Appellant Wyoming and Colorado Railroad Company, Inc. 
("WYCO"), dated December 20, 1988. 
II. Course of Proceeding Below. 
On May 7, 1991, White filed her Complaint in this action 
which, pursuant to court order, was amended on August 1, 1991 (R. 
at 1, 86). On August 27, 1991, WYCO answered the Complaint (R. at 
97) . During the pendency of this action, both parties filed 
Motions for Summary Judgment, which were both denied (R. at 152, 
264, 368). On June 14, 1993, White filed a Motion in Limine, 
seeking an order from the court prohibiting WYCO from submitting 
into evidence any documentation concerning the source of funds 
which were paid to White pursuant to court order in a separate 
action (R. at 371). WYCO filed a Memorandum in Opposition to the 
Motion in Limine (R. at 381), and the Court granted White's Motion 
in Limine on August 24, 1993 (R. at 390). The trial was held on 
October 29, 1993. 
III. Disposition in the Court Below. 
At the conclusion of the trial of this matter, the trial court 
took the matter under advisement and subsequently issued its 
Memorandum Decision on December 29, 1993 (R. at 480). Findings of 
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Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment were entered on January 
21, 1994 (R. at 486, 495) , which Judgment set aside the Trust Deed 
and declared the subject property to still be under the ownership 
of the Plan. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. In January of 1985, the Plan entered into an Ernest Money 
Agreement for the purchase of certain real property located in 
Eden, Utah, from White (Transcript at 34; Exhibit 3). 
2. In a separate action, the Honorable Judge David E. Roth 
found that both parties had breached the contract and that the 
contract would be reinstated upon payment by the Plan of $35,972.91 
and conveyance by White to the Plan of 2.68 acres of the property. 
(Transcript at 38; Exhibit 3). 
3. Judge Roth also found that a mutual mistake had been 
made, and that neither party realized that approximately 10 acres 
of the land had been released at the time the real estate 
transaction closed. (Transcript at 39; Exhibit 3). 
4. In order to make the requirement payment of $35,972.91, 
and to pay attorney's fees, the Plan borrowed $45,972.91 from WYCO. 
(Transcript at 39, 49, 64, 71, 76, 82, 121, 125, 222). 
5. On December 20, 1988, as security for this obligation, 
the Plan executed a Trust Deed Note and Trust Deed in favor of WYCO 
encumbering the 12.68 acres which the Plan was to own free and 
clear pursuant to the court order. (Transcript at 64, 71, 76, 82, 
121, 125, 142, 222, 223). 
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6. Upon the court order in the separate action that the Plan 
pay $35,972.91 to Plaintiff, the Plan had no choice but to encumber 
the subject property in order to obtain the necessary funds to 
comply with the Court Order. (Transcript at 41). 
7. There is no dispute that Plaintiff received $35,972.91 
from the Plan (Transcript at 39, 49) and that the Plan received 
$35,972.91, together with an additional $10,000.00 for legal fees, 
from WYCO in exchange for executing the subject Trust Deed in the 
amount of $45,972.91. (Transcript at 64, 71, 76, 82, 121, 125, 
222) . 
8. The Trust Deed was not recorded sooner because it lacked 
the complete legal description initially and then languished in the 
attorney7s office for a year and a half before recording, in spite 
of instructions from Mr. Scott to properly handle the paperwork. 
(Transcript at 74). 
9. The Plan received $35,972.91, which was paid Plaintiff, 
and which, when combined with the $10,000.00 paid on the Plan's 
legal fees (Transcript at 161), is identical to the obligation 
secured by the Trust Deed executed on December 20, 1988. 
10. At the time the Trust Deed was executed, the Plan had 
been ordered not to dispose of the subject property. (Addendum). 
11. When the legal description of the additional 2.68 acres 
had been created, making a total of 12.68 acres, the total acreage 
which the Plan owned free and clear and which had been ordered 
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conveyed to the Plan by the court was added to the Trust Deed as 
Exhibit A. (Transcript at 31) . 
12. At the time of execution of the Trust Deed, the Plan had 
$100,000.00 in equity on the balance of the property which was 
subject to White's lien. (Transcript at 283). 
13. The subject property was purchased for $6,000 per acre, 
which at 12.68 acres would have also had some equity over and above 
the $45,972.91 Trust Deed in favor of WYCO. (Transcript at 282). 
14. Upon the Plan's default in the payment of its obligation 
to WYCO, the Plan executed a Deed in Lieu of Foreclosure in favor 
of WYCO on May 18, 1990. (Transcript at 45). 
15. The trial court ruled that the Trust Deed Note was 
inadmissible for failure to disclose it to opposing counsel prior 
to the trial. (Transcript at 231, 258). 
16. The Trust Deed Note was given to opposing counsel at the 
deposition of David L. Durbano. (Transcript at 195, 207, 225-26). 
17. What opposing counsel had sought and claimed had not been 
disclosed was "pertaining to the monies, if any, from Wyoming 
Railroad and a check where it might have gone, and how the money 
ultimately got to Susan White." (Transcript at 227). 
18. No financial records from Durbano Mare Island account, 
nor any other evidence of how the money got to White, was produced 
nor could it be used at trial. (Transcript at 195-96). 
19. Circumstantial evidence was presented at trial that the 
Trust Deed Note was provided to counsel, based upon a practice in 
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the law office of placing documents which have been provided to 
opposing counsel in one certain location of the litigation file. 
(Transcript at 177, 193). 
20. White has admitted the existence of the Trust Deed Note. 
(R. at 86, 110, 381). 
21. White was not awarded a deficiency judgment in the other 
action until June 27, 1991. (Transcript at 44). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. The trial court abused its discretion in refusing to 
allow the Trust Deed Note into evidence. At the trial of this 
matter, the evidence proved that the Trust Deed Note had indeed 
been disclosed to the other side. Although Judge Roth had ordered 
early in this case that certain documents could not be used at 
trial because they had not been disclosed, the Trust Deed Note was 
not one of those documents. In addition, White has admitted the 
existence of the Trust Deed Note in multiple pleadings filed in 
this action. 
II. The lower court in this action also refused to allow 
testimony concerning the obligation underlying the Trust Deed. 
This ruling was also an abuse of discretion, which was based upon 
the Parol Evidence Rule, the Statute of Frauds, and the Best 
Evidence Rule. Pursuant to the Parol Evidence Rule, the trial 
court should have reviewed the Trust Deed Note and Trust Deed 
together as the entire agreement between the parties. By refusing 
to admit the Trust Deed Note into evidence, the trial court created 
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ambiguities which should have been explained through oral 
testimony. The Trust Deed itself, which was admitted into 
evidence, satisfied the Statute of Frauds concerning an interest in 
real property. In addition, due to the nexus between the Trust 
Deed and Trust Deed Note, the court should have considered them 
together. Finally, the Best Evidence Rule did not preclude 
testimony concerning the Trust Deed Note, since the document itself 
was deemed to not exist for purposes of the trial and since the 
underlying obligation has an existence independent of any writing. 
III. The Trust Deed is credible documentation of a valid 
encumbrance. The court ruled otherwise based upon when it was 
executed, when a part of its legal description was created, and 
when it was recorded. No evidence was submitted at trial that 
supported a finding or an inference that the document was not 
signed when it was purported to be. The addition of the legal 
description for the 2.68 acres, which description had not been 
created at the time of execution of the Trust Deed, was not a 
falsification but only a correction of the Trust Deed. In 
addition, the fact that the document was not recorded until some 
time after it was executed does not make it invalid. Neither does 
the purported Order of Judge Roth in a different action, which was 
dismissed shortly afterwards. 
IV. The transaction underlying the Trust Deed did not violate 
the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. The Plan received a 
reasonably equivalent value for its execution of the Trust Deed 
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Note and Trust Deed. The only badge of fraud found in U.C.A. §25-
6-1(2) which remotely applies is that the Plan had previously been 
sued by White, Thus, no actual intent to defraud a creditor was 
established at trial. Section 25-6-6 of the Uniform Fraudulent 
Transfer Act is equally inapplicable. 
ARGUMENT 
i. 
The Trial Court Erred in Not Allowing the Trust Deed Note 
Into Evidence. 
At the trial of this matter, the Honorable Judge West refused 
to allow into evidence the Trust Deed Note underlying the Trust 
Deed, even though the Trust Deed itself was admitted into evidence. 
Judge West also refused to allow any testimony concerning the 
obligation evidenced by the Trust Deed Note, but this issue will be 
addressed later in the Brief. Judge West's refusal to allow the 
Trust Deed Note into evidence was an abuse of discretion and was 
improper for all of the reasons discussed below. 
A. The Evidence at Trial Proved that the Trust Deed Note was 
Disclosed. 
The trial court ruled that the Trust Deed Note was 
inadmissible for failure to disclose it to opposing counsel prior 
to the trial. (Transcript at 231, 258.) However, the weight of 
the testimony at trial on this issue was contrary to the finding of 
the trial court. Douglas Durbano testified that the Trust Deed 
Note was given to opposing counsel at the deposition of David 
Durbano. (Transcript at 195, 207). David Durbano also testified 
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that the Trust Deed Note was delivered to opposing counsel at his 
deposition, although arguably biased testimony. (Transcript at 
225-26). Opposing counsel attempted at trial to impeach David 
Durbano's testimony concerning the Trust Deed Note by reading from 
his deposition. However, such deposition testimony only clarified 
that what opposing counsel had sought and claimed had not been 
disclosed was "pertaining to the monies, if any, from Wyoming 
Railroad and a check where it might have gone, and how the money 
ultimately got to Susan White." (Transcript at 227). Douglas 
Durbano testified concerning the fact that no financial records 
from Durbano Mare Island account, nor any other evidence of how the 
money got to Mrs. White, was produced nor could it be used at 
trial. (Transcript at 195-96). However, the evidence at trial 
that the Trust Deed Note was disclosed far outweighed any evidence 
to the contrary. 
Douglas Durbano also testified concerning circumstantial 
evidence that the Trust Deed Note was provided to counsel, based 
upon a practice in his office of placing documents which have been 
provided to opposing counsel in one certain location of the 
litigation file. (Transcript at 193.) The Trust Deed Note was 
found in that location, which is strong circumstantial evidence 
that the Note was disclosed. Mr. Merrill also attempted to testify 
to the same circumstantial evidence but was not allowed to by the 
Court. (Transcript at 177.) The Court was only willing to accept 
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direct testimony concerning disclosure, which was an abuse of 
discretion. 
Opposing counsel stated incessantly on the record that he 
never received the Trust Deed Note which, although not sworn 
testimony, was apparently accepted by the trial court as such. 
This was an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court and 
formed an improper basis for the lower court's finding that the 
Trust Deed Note had not been disclosed. 
Phil Scott testified at trial that he did not recall seeing 
the Trust Deed Note at the time of the deposition of David Durbano. 
(Transcript at 709). However, Mr. Scott also testified that his 
recollection would have been clearer at the time of his deposition. 
(Transcript at 74). In his deposition, Mr. Scott testified that 
there was a Promissory Note concerning the obligation of the Plan 
to WYCO. (Transcript at 142). Mr. Scott's better recollection at 
the time of his deposition, coupled with his obvious bias from 
being terminated shortly before the trial, should have made his 
deposition testimony more credible. However, Judge West ruled to 
the opposite and believed Mr. Scott's trial testimony, as well as 
Mrs. White's testimony, which was also biased. (Transcript at 70) . 
Douglas Durbano's and Mr. Merrill's unbiased testimony was totally 
ignored by the trial court. 
The Utah Supreme Court has long held that the interests of 
justice require that courts look at substance rather than form to 
get at the merits of a question rather than avoiding questions upon 
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technicalities of procedure. Guardian State Bank v. Stancrle, 778 
P.2d 1, 8 (Utah 1989). The trial court should have heeded such 
guidance and rendered judgment on the merits of the legal questions 
involved rather than settling such issues based upon procedural 
technicalities. 
In open court, Judge West stated: "Clearly, if that Note was 
in existence and everybody agreed that it was and that it existed, 
we wouldn't be here today, because then your theory of the case 
would be valid, Mr. Durbano." (Transcript at 189) . Based upon the 
abuse of discretion of the trial court in not allowing the Trust 
Deed Note into evidence, and the statement that Judge West would 
have ruled in Defendants favor if the Note had been allowed, this 
Court should reverse the trial court's decision and grant judgment 
in favor of Defendant. 
B. The Trust Deed Note was not the Subject of Judge Roth's 
Order Concerning Disclosure. 
The trial court's ruling that the Trust Deed Note had not been 
disclosed to opposing counsel was based in part upon an order from 
Judge Roth that the documents which WYCO failed to provide at the 
deposition of David Durbano did not exist and would not be allowed 
at trial. However, as Douglas Durbano testified, the court order 
did not reference the Trust Deed or Deed in Lieu of Foreclosure, 
which documents were allowed into evidence, and that such documents 
together with the Trust Deed Note were not the subject of Judge 
Roth's prior order. (Transcript at 208.) 
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In her Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment, Plaintiff agreed by stating: 
In spite of the subpoenas, the request for 
production, and the court order; to date the defendant 
company and its registered agent and attorney, Douglas 
Durbano, has not produced any records to demonstrate that 
any monies were transferred from the defendant company to 
the pension plan. Consequently, the court issued an 
order that those records do not exist and cannot be used 
at the time of trial. 
(Record at 184). 
Mr, Merrill's testimony also corroborated the fact that the 
records which were not disclosed were "any and all financial 
records of Western Railroad Builders Defined Benefit Pension Plan, 
as well as any financial records of Defendant showing any transfer 
from Defendant to Plan pursuant to the note and trust deed dated 
December 22, 1988." (Transcript at 171). 
Mr. Merrill also testified that "David L. Durbano and Douglas 
M. Durbano, as well as Defendant, have provided Plaintiff with all 
such records that are in their possession, with the possible 
exception of the evidence of payment by Defendant pursuant to the 
Trust Deed." (Transcript at 171). Opposing counsel never 
complained that the Trust Deed Note had not been disclosed, in 
response to this statement. Indeed, the issue of whether the Trust 
Deed Note itself had been disclosed did not arise until the morning 
of trial. For that reason, the trial court abused its discretion 
in finding that the Trust Deed Note had not been disclosed and 
13 
ruling, on the basis of such finding, that the Note was 
inadmissible at trial. 
C. In Prior Pleadings. White has Admitted the Existence 6 
the Trust Deed Note. 
Prior to the trial, Plaintiff filed a Motion in Limine, in 
which Plaintiff stated: 
The defendant through its attorney, Douglas Durbano, 
filed a memorandum in opposition to the motion for 
sanctions, in which the defendant acknowledged that the 
plaintiff was seeking financial records of Western 
Railroad Builders defined benefit pension plan, as well 
as any financial records the defendant had showing the 
transfer of any monies to a pension plan for the note and 
trust deed in question. 
(R. at 381 (emphasis added)). Plaintiff also referenced the Note 
in the same way in the Subpoena served upon WYCO (R. at 110), and 
in the Amended Complaint (R. at 86) . 
Plaintiff's multiple references to the Note in these pleadings 
is a clear acknowledgement of its existence. In addition, WYCO 
also referenced the Note in its Memorandum in Opposition to 
Plaintiff's Motion for Sanctions and/or Contempt (Transcript at 
166, 171). In her Reply Memorandum, Plaintiff referenced WYCO's 
Memorandum without objecting to the language concerning the Note 
(Transcript at 168). Based upon Plaintiff's admissions of the 
existence of the Trust Deed Note, the refusal by the trial court to 
allow the Note into evidence was an abuse of discretion. 
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II. 
The Trial Court Erred in Not Allowing Oral Testimony 
Concerning the Obligation Underlying the Trust Deed. 
In the trial of this matter, Judge West found that the Trust 
Deed was invalid partly because there was no evidence of a loan 
which it was purported to secure. The lack of evidence of the 
underlying obligation was based in part on the Judge's ruling that 
the Trust Deed Note was inadmissible and in part on his ruling that 
testimony concerning the underlying obligation was also 
inadmissible based upon the Parol Evidence Rule, the Statute of 
Frauds and the Best Evidence Rule. Since none of these evidentiary 
rules preclude testimony concerning the underlying obligation, the 
trial court abused its discretion in precluding such testimony. 
For that reason, this Court should reverse the trial court's ruling 
and, based upon the evidence in the record, find the Trust Deed to 
be a valid instrument. 
A. The Parol Evidence Rule Did Not Preclude Testimony 
Concerning the Obligation Underlying the Trust Deed. 
Judge West ruled that oral testimony was not admissible to 
establish the underlying obligation of the Trust Deed, even though 
the document itself was admitted into evidence. Judge West's 
ruling on this issue was based on the well known Parol Evidence 
Rule concerning the use of parol evidence to modify a written 
instrument. However, a close look at the rule shows that it was 
improperly applied by the trial court in this action. 
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The Parol Evidence Rule, as stated by Professor Corbin, is as 
follows: 
When two parties have made a contract and have expressed 
it in writing to which they both have assented as the 
complete and accurate integration of that contract, 
evidence, whether parol or otherwise, of antecedent 
understandings and negotiations will not be admitted for 
the purpose of varying or contradicting the writing. 
3 Corbin on Contracts § 573. From this statement of the Rule, the 
following conclusions may be directly derived: (1) the Parol 
Evidence Rule comes into play only when the last expression is in 
writing and is a binding contract, See J.D. Calamari & J.M. 
Perillo, Contracts §3-2, p.99 (2d ed. 1979); (2) the Parol Evidence 
Rule only applies to fully integrated and complete contracts, id. 
at pp. 101-03; and (3) evidence which neither varies or contradicts 
the writing is admissible under the Rule. Rowley v. Marrcrest 
Homeowners' Ass'n, 656 P.2d 414, 417 (Utah 1982) ("As in all parol 
evidence cases, oral testimony may not be admitted to vary or 
contradict the terms of a document; however, it is admissible to 
clarify the meaning of ambiguous provisions.11); see also Mercury 
Inv. Co. v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 706 P.2d 523, 529 (Okl. 1985) 
(parol or extrinsic evidence is generally admissible when such 
evidence does not contradict any particular term of the writing). 
"But where a contract is complete in itself and, as viewed in 
its entirety, is unambiguous, its language is the only legitimate 
evidence of what the parties intended." Mercury Inv. Co. 706 P.2d 
at 529 (emphasis in original) . Thus, where the entire document is 
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not before the court, and there is a latent ambiguity in the 
written text, parol testimony is admissible to explain the 
ambiguity. Id. Moreover, introduction of parol evidence is proper 
when such evidence "does not contradict the writing but merely 
explains the transaction." Zeese v. Estate of Siecrel, 534 P.2d 85, 
88 (Utah 1975). Finally, parol evidence may be admitted to clarify 
the intentions of the parties. Bybee v. Stuart, 112 Utah 462, 466, 
189 P.2d 118, 122 (1948). 
Applied to the case at hand, the preceding legal principles 
required the trial court to do one of two things. First, the lower 
court should have reviewed the subject agreement in its entirety to 
determine the parties7 intentions. Mercury Inv. Co., 706 P.2d at 
529. The entire agreement at issue involved both the Trust Deed 
and the underlying Trust Deed Note, which the Trust Deed expressly 
incorporated. By not allowing the Note to be admitted into 
evidence, Judge West in essence reviewed the contract in an 
incomplete state and ruled on such contract without reviewing all 
relevant language. 
Clearly, by ignoring relevant contract language found in the 
Trust Deed Note, the trial court in fact created ambiguities in the 
transaction which the Note alone could remedy. Based upon these 
ambiguities, such as the interest rate and term of the loan, oral 
testimony should have been admissible for explanatory purposes. 
Id; Zeese, 534 P.2d 85. Defendant should have been allowed to 
present testimony to explain these ambiguities, so long as the 
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testimony did not change or contradict the Trust Deed itself. 
Rowley, 656 P.2d at 417. The trial court's refusal to allow such 
testimony was an abuse of discretion, which resulted in judgment 
against Defendant. This Court should either reverse the trial 
court and grant judgment in favor of WYCO based upon the testimony 
which is in the record, or remand this action back for a new trial. 
B. The Trial Court Misapplied the Statute of Frauds to the 
Present Action. 
The trial court also excluded all testimony concerning the 
obligation underlying the Trust Deed based upon the application of 
the Statute of Frauds. Although the Statute of Frauds does apply 
to an interest in real property, Judge West misapplied the statute 
in the case at bar to preclude evidence of the Trust Deed Note. 
U.C.A. §25-5-1, that part of the Statute of Frauds which deals 
with estates or interests in real property, states as follows: 
No estate or interest in real property, other than 
leases for a term not exceeding one year, nor any trust 
or power over or concerning real property or in any 
manner relating thereto, shall be created, granted, 
assigned, surrendered, or declared otherwise than by act 
or operation of law, or by deed or conveyance in writing 
subscribed by the party creating, granting, assigning, 
surrendering or declaring the same, or by his lawful 
agent thereunto authorized by writing. 
What Judge West failed to understand is that the Trust Deed, 
which by stipulation was admitted into evidence, satisfies the 
Statute of Frauds concerning the interest in real property. 
Nowhere in the Statute of Frauds is it necessary for the underlying 
obligation of the Trust Deed to be a written document. This is a 
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ruling from the trial court which is not supported by the statute 
or by case law. Thus, the trial court misapplied the Statute of 
Frauds and should have allowed oral testimony concerning the 
obligation underlying the Trust Deed. 
In addition, this Court has previously stated that: 
One or more writings, not all of which are signed by the 
party to be charged, may be considered together as a 
memorandum for purposes of the statute of frauds if there is 
a nexus between them. 
Machan Hampshire v. Western Real Estate, 779 P.2d 230, 234 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1989). Based upon Machan, the trial court should have 
considered the Trust Deed and the Trust Deed Note together, due to 
the nexus between them and the fact that the Trust Deed Note is 
referenced in the Trust Deed. Thus, application of the Statute of 
Frauds supports the admission of the Trust Deed Note as opposed to 
precluding it or testimony concerning it. 
C. Oral Testimony Concerning the Obligation Underlying the 
Trust Deed was Admissible Based Upon The Best Evidence Rule. 
Although the trial court did not reference The Best Evidence 
Rule in the trial, it was argued to the Court prior to the trial, 
in the hearing on Plaintiff's Motion in Limine, and for that reason 
will be addressed here. Rule 1002 of the Utah Rules of Evidence 
states that: 
To prove the content of a writing, . . . the 
original writing . . . is required, except as otherwise 
provided in these rules or by other rules adopted by the 
Supreme Court of this State or by Statute. 
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One such rule is Rule 1004 of the Utah Rules of Evidence which 
states that: 
The original is not required, and other evidence of 
the contents of a writing . . . is admissible if: 
(1) • . . All originals are lost or have been 
destroyed, unless the proponent lost or destroyed them in 
bad faith; 
In the case at bar, although the original Trust Deed Note was 
never lost or destroyed, the trial court ruled that for purposes of 
the trial, it did not exist. This has the effect of the document 
being lost or destroyed, through no bad faith of Defendant, and for 
that reason, Rule 1004 allows for other evidence, including oral 
testimony, concerning the obligation underlying the Trust Deed. In 
addition, the Best Evidence Rule has no application when a party is 
trying to prove a fact which has an existence independent of any 
writing, such as the obligation underlying the Trust Deed. Roods 
v. Roods, 645 P.2d 640, 642 (Utah 1982). Thus, the Best Evidence 
Rule, as Rules 1001 through 1008 of the Utah Rules of Evidence are 
commonly called, supports the admittance into evidence of oral 
testimony concerning the contents of the Trust Deed Note, as 
opposed to precluding it. Based upon all the reasons above, this 
Court should consider the evidence on the record concerning the 
obligation underlying the Trust Deed and rule that the Trust Deed 
was a valid document. 
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III. 
The Trust Deed is Credible Documentation of a Valid 
Encumbrance• 
In the Findings of Fact No. 9, Judge West found the Trust Deed 
to not be credible documentation of a valid encumbrance. His 
finding was based upon concerns that the Trust Deed was allegedly 
executed on December 20, 1998, that part of its legal description 
was not created until March 6, 1989, and that it was not recorded 
until May 18, 1990. Based upon these concerns, the trial court 
doubted the authenticity of the Trust Deed and therefore found it 
not credible. However, as discussed below, such concerns are 
either unwarranted from the evidence or do not result in a 
challenge to the authenticity of the Trust Deed. 
The trial court first questioned whether the document was 
actually executed on December 20, 1988, the date it is purported to 
be executed and the date of the notarization on the document. 
Plaintiff presented no evidence at trial to challenge the 
notarization, and rightly so, since no such evidence exists (R. at 
346) . No evidence was submitted at trial which controverted the 
date on the Trust Deed as well. Mr. Scott, who certainly had good 
reason to be biased, testified at trial that he simply could not 
remember when the Trust Deed was signed, although in his 
deposition, he remembered it being about the time the check was 
signed in December of 1988. (Transcript at 143-44). Dave Durbano 
could also not recall the exact date that he signed the Trust Deed, 
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but he did testify that he assumed he signed it on the date found 
on the Trust Deed, since he signed it in Doug Durbano's office. 
(Transcript at 279). 
David Durbano also testified that he executed the Trust Deed 
Note in December, 1988, which is the same time the Trust Deed would 
have been signed. (Transcript at 223). Although Plaintiff's 
counsel argued incessantly that the Trust Deed was executed after 
the date found on it, the fact of the matter is that Plaintiff 
failed to submit one shred of evidence of such alleged fact. In 
spite of the lack of such evidence, the trial court apparently 
agreed with Defendant's counsel and found that the document was 
"allegedly" signed on that date. Since there is no basis in the 
record for such a finding, the trial court's abuse of discretion is 
clear. 
The next concern on the Court's part over the Trust Deed was 
the fact that part of the legal description did not exist until 
March 6, 1989. Plaintiff argued that the addition to the legal 
description of the 2.68 acres, which additional description was 
created after the execution of the Trust Deed, is an alteration of 
the Trust Deed, making it void, citing Rasmussen v. Olsen, 583 P.2d 
50 (Utah 1978). In Rasmussen, one party to a deed obliterated a 
paragraph reserving mineral rights, prior to recording the deed. 
Id. at 51. The Utah Supreme Court found that the deed was forged 
and therefore void. Id. at 52-53. 
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The case at bar is not one where a party to a trust deed 
altered the terms of the trust deed before recording, unbeknownst 
to the other parties. In this case, all parties to the Trust Deed, 
including the Trustee, were well aware that the legal description 
of the Trust Deed, at the time of its execution, was insufficient 
and only covered 10 of the 12.68 acres which needed to be 
encumbered. Once the description for the additional 2.68 acres had 
been created by Great Basin Engineering, on March 6, 1993 
(Transcript at 31), it was added to the legal description of the 
Trust Deed prior to recording. Such addition was known to all 
three parties to the Trust Deed and therefore was not a forgery. 
For that reason, Rasmussen does not stand for the proposition that 
the Trust Deed in this case is void. 
Plaintiff's allegation that the Trust Deed has been falsified 
or forged also fails upon the examination of the circumstances 
surrounding its execution. In the construction of deeds: 
The modern tendency is to disregard technicalities 
and to treat all uncertainties in a conveyance as 
ambiguities to be clarified by resort to the intention of 
the parties as gathered from the instrument itself, the 
circumstances attending and leading up to its execution, 
and the subject matter and the situation of the parties 
as of that time. Substance rather than form controls. 
Hence, in the construction of deeds, surrounding 
circumstances are accorded due weight. In the 
construction of these various factors, the court will 
place itself as nearly as possible in the position of the 
parties when the instrument was executed, and where the 
language of a deed is ambiguous, the intention of the 
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parties may be ascertained by a consideration of the 
surrounding circumstances existing at the time of the 
execution of the deed. 
23 Am. Jur. 2d Deeds § 221 (1983) . An examination of the 
circumstances surrounding the execution of this Trust Deed shows 
clearly that the legal description comports with the order of the 
court, and that the Trust Deed has not been falsified. 
Plaintiff was required to deed to the Plan an additional 2.68 
acres of the subject property by court order. (Transcript at 39-
40) . The Plan was also required by court order to pay Plaintiff 
$35,972.91. The Plan borrowed the funds necessary to make the 
payment from WYCO. As security for the obligation, the Plan 
executed a Trust Deed Note and Trust Deed in favor of WYCO covering 
the 12.68 acres, 10 of which had already been conveyed by White and 
2.68 of which White conveyed to the Plan free and clear after the 
legal description had been created. Due to the short time frame in 
which to make the payment to Plaintiff referenced above, the 
transaction was consummated and the Trust Deed executed prior to 
the creation of the legal description for the additional 2.68 
acres. Then, when the additional description had been created, 
White deeded the additional acreage to the Plan, and the Exhibit 
"A" was attached to the Trust Deed prior to recording. Thus, the 
subject Trust Deed was not in any way falsified or forged but 
simply corrected. 
The same effect could have been accomplished through the use 
of a deed of correction: 
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A deed of confirmation may be appropriately utilized 
in order to remove doubts as the operativeness of a prior 
deed to convey title to the land intended. For example, 
a mistake in the description of the land conveyed may be 
corrected by a subsequent deed executed by the same 
grantor for the purpose of correcting the description and 
confirming in the grantee the title to the land intended 
to have been described in the prior deed, and the two 
deeds, taken together, will operate to pass the title to 
the grantee named therein. 
As between the parties a confirming or correction 
deed relates back to the date of the original instrument; 
23 Am. Jur. 2d Deeds § 333-34 (1983) . The parties to the Trust 
Deed in question should not be required to jump through such 
procedural hoops, when the intent of the grantor is reasonably 
determinable. Howard v. Howard. 367 P.2d 193, 195 (Utah 1962). 
For that reason, the trial court should have found that the Trust 
Deed was not falsified but only corrected to describe the 
appropriate 12.68 acres. Based upon the evidence in the record, 
this Court should find that the Trust Deed was not falsified or 
forged and overrule the trial court on this issue. 
Implied in the trial court's ruling is that no consideration 
was given for the Trust Deed. However, as between the parties to 
the Trust Deed, with or without consideration the Trust Deed is 
valid. Barlow Soc. v. Commercial Sec. Bank. 723 P.2d 398, 401 
(Utah 1986) . The only real issue concerning the validity of the 
Trust Deed is if it worked a fraud upon creditors, specifically 
Plaintiff herein. This issue is addressed elsewhere in the Brief. 
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However, based on Barlow, this Court should find the Trust Deed to 
be a valid and authentic document. 
The final concern expressed by Judge West in the Findings of 
Fact was that the Trust Deed was not recorded until the same day as 
the Deed in Lieu of Foreclosure. Although recording is required to 
give notice to the world concerning an interest in real property, 
the fact that a document is not recorded until some time after it 
is executed does not make it invalid. Huntington City v. Peterson, 
518 P.2d 1246, 1247-48 (Utah 1974); Bekins Bar V Ranch v. Bervl 
Baptist Church. 642 P.2d 371, 373 (Utah 1982). Thus, the fact that 
the Trust Deed was not recorded for some time does not effect its 
validity or authenticity. Indeed, the facts of this case and the 
law do not support Judge West's concern over the authenticity of 
the Trust Deed, and this Court should reverse the trial court and 
find the Trust Deed to be a valid and enforceable document. 
At the trial below, Judge West also questioned the 
authenticity of the Trust Deed based on an order entered by Judge 
Roth in a different action on October 27, 1988, prohibiting the 
Plan from transferring or encumbering the subject property. In the 
first place, as shown in the Minute Entry from Judge Roth dated 
October 11, 1988, his ruling was that the parties were not to 
dispose of the property. (Addendum). When Plaintiff's counsel 
drafted the order and submitted it to Judge Roth, Defendant's 
counsel failed to notice the addition by Defendant's counsel of a 
prohibition on encumbrance also. However, the testimony is clear 
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that the Plan had no unencumbered assets but the 12.68 acres of 
property which is the subject of this lawsuit. Upon the court 
order in the separate action that the Plan pay $35,972.91 to White, 
the Plan had no choice but to encumber the subject property in 
order to obtain the necessary funds to comply with the court order. 
(Transcript at 41.) 
In addition, Plaintiff later acquiesced to the dismissal of 
Civil Case No. 1694-88 on June 15, 1989 (Transcript at 42), 
effectively waiving any objection she may have had to the 
encumbrance on the subject property. Therefore, the Trust Deed was 
validly executed, and upon default thereon, the Plan properly 
executed a Deed in Lieu of Foreclosure transferring the subject 
property to WYCO. For that reason, this Court should reverse the 
trial court and grant judgment in favor of WYCO. 
IV. 
The Transaction Underlying the Trust Deed did not Violate 
the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. 
The final basis upon which Judge West found the Trust Deed, 
and the transaction underlying it, invalid is based on the Uniform 
Fraudulent Transfer Act. The trial court gave no specific findings 
concerning such violation but simply stated generally that "the 
court is satisfied that the Plaintiff's analysis under Section 25-
6-5 U.C.A. and Section 25-6-6 U.C.A. is correct." Finding No. 11. 
However, an examination of the elements in the statute reveals that 
the Trust Deed was not a fraudulent encumbrance. 
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Two sections of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act might 
apply to the facts in this action. The first, §25-6-5, applies to 
claims arising before or after an encumbrance and states: 
(1) A transfer made or obligation incurred by a 
debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor, whether the 
creditor's claim arose before or after the transfer was 
made or the obligation was incurred, if the debtor made 
the transfer or incurred the obligation: 
(a) with actual intent to hinder, delay, 
or defraud any creditor of the debtor; or 
(b) without receiving a reasonably 
equivalent value in exchange for the transfer 
or obligation; and the debtor: 
(i) was engaged or was about 
to engage in a business or a 
transaction for which the remaining 
assets of the debtor were 
unreasonably small in relation to 
the business or transaction; or 
(ii) intended to incur, or 
believed or reasonably should have 
believed that he would incur, debts 
beyond his ability to pay as they 
became due. 
There is no dispute that Plaintiff received $35,972.91 from 
the Plan (Transcript at 39, 49) and that the Plan received that 
$35,972.91, together with an additional $10,000.00 for legal fees, 
from WYCO in exchange for executing the subject Trust Deed in the 
amount of $45,972.91. (Transcript at 64, 71, 76, 82, 121, 125, 
222) . For that reason, Subparagraph (b) of §25-6-5 is not 
applicable, since the Plan received a "reasonably equivalent value 
in exchange for the transfer or obligation." Thus, the Trust Deed 
could be a fraudulent encumbrance under §25-6-5 only if the Trust 
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Deed was executed "with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud 
any creditor of the debtor," pursuant to Subparagraph (a). 
Paragraph (2) of §25-6-5 addresses some "badges of fraud" upon 
which a court may infer actual intent under the statute. Dahnken, 
Inc. of Salt Lake City v. Wilmarth. 726 P.2d 420, 423 (Utah 1986). 
These badges are factors for a court to consider in a determination 
of actual intent to defraud a creditor. A close examination of the 
eleven badges found in §25-6-5(2) reveals that no evidence was 
presented to the trial court that the Plan had any actual intent to 
defraud a creditor in executing the Trust Deed dated December 20, 
1988. 
The first badge in subparagraph (a) is that the "obligation 
was to an insider." The trial court did not make a finding that 
this factor was involved, although David Durbano did testify at 
trial concerning his relationship with WYCO and the Plan. 
"Insider" is defined in §25-6-2(7), which includes definitions if 
the debtor, i.e., the Plan, is an individual, corporation, or 
partnership. The Plan is most closely akin to a corporation. WYCO 
is not an insider of the Plan, in that no evidence was submitted at 
trial that WYCO is a director, officer, or person in control of the 
Plan, a partnership in which the Plan is a general partner or a 
general partner in a partnership described elsewhere in the 
section, or a relative of anyone. In addition, no evidence was 
submitted that WYCO was an affiliate, or an insider of an 
affiliate, as discussed in §25-6-2(7)(d) and §25-6-2(1), or a 
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managing agent of the Plan, pursuant to §25-6-2(7)(e). Therefore, 
no finding of actual intent to defraud can be based upon the first 
badge of fraud. 
The second badge is that the "debtor retained possession or 
control of the property transferred after the transfer." This 
badge obviously does not apply when the action taken was to incur 
an obligation as opposed to the transfer of property. Since the 
Plan did not transfer property on December 20, 1988, but only 
executed a Trust Deed on that date, the second badge of fraud is 
also not applicable. 
The third badge is whether the "obligation was disclosed or 
concealed." Neither the Plan nor WYCO were under any duty to 
disclose the Trust Deed, nor was any evidence submitted that either 
party made any intentional efforts to conceal the Trust Deed. The 
Trust Deed was not recorded sooner because it lacked the complete 
legal description initially and then languished in the attorney's 
office for a year and a half before recording, in spite of 
instructions from Mr. Scott to properly handle the paperwork. 
(Transcript at 74) . In the absence of any evidence of intentional 
concealment, the third badge of fraud provides no basis upon which 
intent to defraud can be inferred. 
The fourth badge is that before the "obligation was incurred, 
the debtor had been sued or threatened with suit." While it is 
true that Plaintiff had sued the Plan prior to the execution by the 
Plan of the Trust Deed, the Trust Deed was only executed in order 
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to raise the funds required by the court to be paid by the Plan to 
Plaintiff. Thus, this badge of fraud, if applicable at all, should 
not have been given much weight in the court's determination of any 
alleged intent to defraud. 
The fifth badge of fraud is that "the transfer was of 
substantially all the debtor's assets." Again, this badge deals 
only with a transfer of assets, as opposed to incurring an 
obligation. Since the action taken by the Plan on December 20, 
1988, was not a transfer of assets, this badge also is applicable. 
The sixth badge is that "the debtor absconded." Black's Law 
Dictionary, Fifth Edition, defines absconding debtor as "one who 
absconds (hide, conceal, or absent oneself clandestinely) from his 
creditors" or "one who lives without the state, or who has 
intentionally concealed himself from his creditors, or withdrawn 
himself from the reach of their suits, with intent to frustrate 
their just demands." The Plan was earlier sued by Plaintiff in the 
action which was dismissed on June 15, 1989, and the Plan never 
absconded from Plaintiff. For that reason, the sixth badge of 
fraud is also inapplicable. 
The seventh badge of fraud is that "the debtor removed or 
concealed assets." The Plan has neither removed or concealed any 
assets. The only action which the Plan took on December 20, 1988, 
was to incur an obligation against an asset, in order to comply 
with the court order, for the benefit of Plaintiff. For that 
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reason, the trial court could not infer any intent to defraud from 
badge number seven. 
Badge number eight is that "the value of the consideration 
received by the debtor is reasonably equivalent to the value of the 
asset transferred or the amount of the obligation incurred." The 
evidence is clear that the Plan received $35,972.91, which was paid 
Plaintiff, and which, when combined with the $10,000.00 paid on the 
Plan's legal fees (Transcript at 161), is identical to the 
obligation secured by the Trust Deed executed on December 20, 1988. 
Not only is the value reasonably equivalent but it is exactly 
equivalent. For that reason, this badge of fraud is not 
applicable. 
The ninth badge of fraud is that "the debtor was insolvent or 
became insolvent shortly after the transfer was made or the 
obligation was incurred." The first definition of insolvency under 
§25-6-3 of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act is that "the sum of 
the debtor's debts is greater than all of the debtor's assets." 
David Durbano testified at trial that at the time of execution of 
the Trust Deed, the Plan had $100,000.00 in equity on the balance 
of the property which was subject to Plaintiff's lien. (Transcript 
at 283) . He also testified that the subject property was purchased 
for $6,000 per acre, which at 12.68 acres would have also had some 
equity over and above the $45,972.91 Trust Deed in favor of WYCO. 
(Transcript at 282). Judge West acknowledged at trial that Mr. 
Durbano's testimony bore directly on the issue of intent to 
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defraud. (Transcript at 284). Based upon Mr. Durbano's 
uncontroverted testimony, the Plan's debts were not greater than 
its assets. 
A debtor is also presumed to be insolvent under the statute if 
he is "generally not paying his debts as they become due." U.C.A. 
§25-6-3(2) . The only evidence presented at trial of any failure on 
the part of the Plan to pay any debt were the two defaults on the 
obligation to Plaintiff. (Transcript at 37, 42). Evidence of two 
occasions of default on one obligation does not establish that the 
Plan was "generally" not paying its debts, making this badge of 
fraud also inapplicable. 
The last two badges of fraud also deal with transfers of 
assets as opposed to the incurring of an obligation. Thus, of all 
the badges of fraud found in the statute, the only one which could 
possibly apply to the execution of the Trust Deed by the Plan on 
December 20, 1988, is the fact that the Plan had previously been 
sued by Plaintiff. However, it was to Plaintiff's benefit, and to 
cure the first default, that the Plan borrowed money from WYCO in 
the first place. Based upon the paucity of evidence concerning any 
"actual intent" of the Plan to hinder any creditor by the execution 
of the Trust Deed, the trial could should have ruled that the Trust 
Deed did not violate §25-6-5 of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer 
Act. 
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The trial court also found that execution of the Trust Deed 
violated §25-6-6 of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, which 
states: 
(1) A transfer made or obligation incurred by a 
debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor whose claim arose 
before the transfer was made or the obligation was 
incurred if: 
(a) the debtor made the transfer or 
incurred the obligation without receiving a 
reasonably equivalent value in exchange for 
the transfer or obligation; and 
(b) the debtor was insolvent at the time 
or became insolvent as a result of the 
transfer or obligation. 
(2) A transfer made by a debtor is fraudulent as to 
a creditor whose claim arose before the transfer was made 
if the transfer was made to an insider for an antecedent 
debt, the debtor was insolvent at the time, and the 
insider had reasonable cause to believe that the debtor 
was insolvent. 
Initially, it is arguable whether Plaintiff even had a claim 
against the Plan prior to the date of the Trust Deed, in that 
Plaintiff was not awarded a deficiency judgment until June 27, 
1991. (Transcript at 44) . However, assuming arguendo that 
Plaintiff did have a claim against the Plan prior to December 20, 
1988, the trial court's finding that the Trust Deed violated §26-6-
6 of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act was also improper. 
Paragraph 1 of §25-6-6 is only satisfied if both Subparagraphs 
(a) and (b) are met. Subparagraph (a) requires that the debtor 
incurred the obligation without receiving a reasonably equivalent 
value in exchange for the obligation. It is clear in the case at 
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hand that the Plan received $35,972.91, which money went to 
Plaintiff, in exchange for executing the Trust Deed. Therefore, 
when combined with $10,000.00 in legal fees incurred by the Plan, 
the Plan received not only a reasonably equivalent value but an 
exactly equivalent value. For that reason Subparagraph (a) is not 
met, making Paragraph (1) if §25-6-6 inapplicable. 
The second paragraph of §25-6-6 deals only with a transfer, as 
opposed to the incurring of an obligation, making the second 
paragraph inapplicable, because the Plan did not transfer property 
but only incurred an obligation on December 20, 1988. In addition, 
a transfer of assets under §25-6-6(2) must be made to an insider 
for an antecedent debt. As discussed earlier, the obligation was 
not incurred to an insider, nor was it made for an antecedent debt, 
but for a concurrent one. Finally, a transfer is not voidable 
under §25-6-6(2) if new value is given to the debtor, which is the 
case here. U.C.A. §25-6-9(6)(a). Thus, Plaintiff failed to 
establish at trial that the Trust Deed violated §25-6-6 of the 
Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. The trial court's finding of such 
violation was an abuse of discretion and should be reversed by this 
Court. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon the arguments above and the record before this 
court, WYCO respectfully requests that the Court reverse the trial 
court's ruling and grant judgment in favor of WYCO. In the 
alternative, WYCO requests the Court to remand this matter for a 
new trial. 
DATED this / / day of November, 1994. 
DURBANO & ASSOCIATES 
fq/xz 
Douglas M. Durbaho 
Walter T. Merrill 
Attorneys for 
Defendant/Appellant 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
SUSAN WHITE, 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THE WYOMING & COLORADO RAIL, 
Defendant. 
Civil No. 910912250CV 
The above-entitled matter came on for hearing before 
the Honorable Brent West on the 29th day of October, 1993. The 
Plaintiff was present in court represented by her attorney, Robert 
A. Echard. The Defendant was present in court represented by its 
attorney Douglas Durbano. The court having received evidence in 
the form of testimony and exhibits and having heard arguments from 
the parties and being fully informed in the premises, now 
therefore makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On or about the 13th of day of lebruary, 1985, 
David L. Durbano, as Trustee of Western Railroad Defined Benefit 
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Pension Plan, executed a trust deed and a trust deed note with the 
Plaintiff and her then husband Melvin T. Kemp in the sum of 
5283,290.'10 at 10# interest per annum. Said trust deed was 
secured by a approximately 60 acres of property located in the 
Ogden Valley, Weber Count;/, State of Utah. 
2. On July 11, 1986, a Notice of Default on the trust 
deed was served on Western Railroad Builders Defined Benefit 
Pension Plan, David L. Durbano, Trustee, by Susan White. That 
Notice of Default was the basis for the initiation of two (2) 
separate lawsuits. One was entitled Western Railroad Builder's 
Defined Benefit Pension Plan, David L. Durbano, Trustee, Plaintiff 
vs Susan H. Kemp aka Susan H. White and John Does 1 through 5 
inclusive, which lawsuit was filed in the Weber County District 
Court and identified as Civil No. 97872. In that lawsuit the 
Plaintiff attempted to prevent Susan White from foreclosing on the 
trust deed. 
The other lawsuit that was created was entitled Susan H. 
Kemp aka Susan H. White, Plaintiff vs Western Railroad Builder's 
Defined Benefit Pension Plan, David L. Durbano, Trustee, filed in 
Weber County, identified as Civil No. 1694-88. That lawsuit v;as 
for the purpose of foreclosing on the real property. On the 20th 
day of December, 1988, in that lawsuit, Judge Roth entered an 
order which prohibited Western Railroad Builder's Defined Benefit 
Pension Plan from disposing of or encumbering approximately ten 
(10) acres of the 60 acres which was held in its name. Said order 
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remained in existence until the 15th day of June, 1993, when said 
lawsuit was dismissed. 
3. The lawsuit of Western Railroad Builder's Defined 
Benefit Pension Plan, David L. Durbano Trustee vs Susan H. Kemp 
aka Susan H. White, was ultimately resolved by the Plaintiff 
paying to the Defendant a $17,500.00 payment that was delinquent 
plus $18,472.00 that was owed to an underlining obligation on the 
property. Said sums were paid to Susan II. White on the 22nd day 
of December, 1989. That lawsuit also required Susan H. White to 
release to the Plaintiff 2.68 acres of additional land, which land 
was conveyed to the Plaintiff on the 5th day March, 1989, making 
a total acreage then possessed by the Plaintiff in the amount of 
12.68 acres. 
'I. After the reinstating of the trust deed and trust 
deed note, Western Railroad Builderfs Defined Benefit Pension Plan 
again became delinquent in its payments and a trustee's sale was 
held on the 18th day of May, 1990 at which the approximately 50 
acres of land then secured under the trust deed was purchased by 
Susan II. White. Thereafter a lawsuit was filed in Weber County 
by Susan H. White for a deficiency under the trust deed note. 
That lawsuit was entitled Susan White, Plaintiff vs Western 
Railroad BuilderTs Defined Benefit Pension Plan, David L. Durbano, 
Trustee, and identified as Civil No. 900901419. The Plaintiff in 
that case was granted a judgment in the sum of $86,040.74, plus 
interest at the rate of 10 per cent from May 18, 1990 to May 8, 
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1991, in the sum of $8,367-35 and 12 per cent interest thereafter. 
Said judgment was entered on June 5, 1991-
5. On the 18th day of May, 1990, Douglas M. Durbano, 
as the attorney for Western Railroad Builder's Defined Benefit 
Pension Plan, recorded a trust deed, which was dated the 20th day 
of December, 1988. The Trustor on said deed was David L. Durbano, 
Trustee of Western Railroad Builder's Defined Benefit Pension 
Plan. The Trustee was Douglas M. Durbano, Attorney at Law and the 
beneficiary was the Wyoming and Colorado Railroad Company, Inc. 
Said trust deed stated that it was issued to secure a principle 
debt in the sum of $45,972.91. The trust deed included a legal 
description containing approximately 10 acres of land and a second 
legal description containing 2.68 acres of land. The legal 
description of the 2.68 acres of land was not created and did not 
exist until March 6, 1989 at which time it had been prepared by 
Great Basin Engineering Inc. at the request of Western Railroad 
Builder's Defined Benefit Pension Plan. 
6, On the same date that said trust deed was recorded, 
the 18th day of May, 1990, a document entitled Deed in Lieu of 
Foreclosure was also recorded, which deed was signed by David L. 
Durbano as the Trustee of the Western Railroad Builder's Defined 
Benefit Pension Plan and dated the 18th day of May, 1990. Said 
deed purported to transfer the 12.68 acres, which description was 
attached to the trust deed, in lieu of foreclosure. 
7* The transfer of the 12.68 »^cres of land from 
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Western Railroad Builder's Defined Benefit Pension Plan left said 
plan insolvent and without any assets. 
8. After the complaint in this action was filed, the 
Plaintiff attempted to obtain documents from the Defendant, 
Wyoming and Colorado Railroad Company, Inc. and from David L. 
Durbano by serving subpoenas, notices of depositions and by court 
order. A deposition was held on March 31, 1992 at 1:30 p.m. in 
the jury room of Judge Ronald 0. Hyde, at which time Douglas M. 
Durbano, David L. Durbano and Phillip D. Scott, President of 
Wyoming and Colorado Railroad were to appear and produce documents 
and have their depositions taken, No documents were produced at 
that time with the exception of some cashier's checks. As a 
result of the failure of the Defendant and the other parties to 
produce documents, Judge Roth entered an order on the 12th day of 
June, 1992 that the Defendant's documents were inadmissible 
because the Defendant had failed to find or produce the documents 
during discovery. Judge Roth's order read, in part, as follows: 
11
. . . with the exception of cashier's check, which were presented 
to the Plaintiff's counsel during the course of the deposition, 
none of the documents requested by Plaintiff exist and will not 
exist and will not be used as evidence . . . as a penalty, the 
Defendant will not be allowed to use any other documentary 
evidence even if discovery between now and the time of the time 
of the trial." Subsequently, the Court upheld Judge Roth's 
ruling. This case was filed on May 7, 1991. The hearing before 
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Judge Roth was on June 18, 1992. The hearing before this Court 
was on August 24, 1993- Judge Roth's discovery guidelines were 
fair and reasonable. The Defendant had ample time to find and 
produce the documents/ It did not. The Defendant attempted to 
admit a series of documents at the time of the trial which 
purportedly established the existence of the transfer or 
encumbrance. The Court finds the documents inadmissible. Without 
the documents, there is little or no evidence to support the 
existence of a valid transfer or encumbrance of the 12.68 acres 
of real property. 
9. The second issue concerns the one document that has 
been available, the deed of trust. The deed of trust purports to 
transfer or encumber the third party's interest in the real 
property to the Defendant. the court has real concerns about the 
authenticity of the trust deed. The trust deed was allegedly 
executed on December 20, 1988. However, it contained a legal 
description that didn't even exist until March 6, 1989. The trust 
deed wasn't even recorded until May 18, 1990. The trust deed is 
not a credible documentation that there was a valid transfer or 
encumbrance. 
10. On October 27, 1988, Judge Roth entered an order as 
sent forth in paragraph 2 of these findings. Despite being under 
that order, the Western Railroad Builder's Defined Benefit Pension 
Plan attempted to transfer or encumber the real property to this 
Defendant. 
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11. The Plaintiff has alleged in the alternative that 
the transfer violates the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, Section 
25-6-1, et Seq. U.C.A. The Plaintiff reliance upon these 
provisions assumes t,he existence of a valid transfer or 
encumbrance of the real property involved. This is at odds with 
the Court's ruling in the above paragraphs. However, even 
assuming, for the sake of argument, that the transfer or 
encumbrance in this case was valid, the Court is satisfied that 
the transaction would be in violation of the Act and subject to 
avoidance. The Act provides that creditors may obtain avoidance 
of the transfer to the extent necessary to satisfy the creditor's 
claim. See Section 25-6-8(1)(a) U.C.A. Without going into great 
detail or explanation, the Court is satisfied that the Plaintiff's 
analysis under Section 25-6-5 U.C.A. and Section 25-6-6 U.C.A. is 
correct. 
12. No award for attorney's fees is made. The Court 
can find no statute or case law that provides for an award of 
attorney's fees in this type of case. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The purported transfer of 12.68 acres of land from 
the Western Railroad Builder's Defined Benefit Pension Plan, David 
L. Durbano Trustee, to the Wyoming and Colorado Railroad Company 
Inc. , purportedly made pursuant to a trust deed and a deed in lieu 
of foreclosure, both of which were recorded on May 18, 1990 is 
declared void and is hereby avoided, set aside and/or nullified. 
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Said rcaJ property is more particularly described as follows: 
A part of the North half of Section 19, Township 7 
North, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, U.S. Survey: 
Beginning at a point in an existing fence being 60 feet 
North 0°12' West along, said fence from an existing fence corner, 
being 725.1 feet North'and 21.8 feet West of the Southeast corner 
or the Southwest Quarter of the Northeast Quarter of said Section 
19, and running thence North 89° ^ 0' West 869-28 feet; thence North 
o'l2' West 486.88 feet; thence North 87°17' East 518.23 feet to 
a point on the Westerly right-of-way curve of the County Road 
(said curve having a radius of 2^ 40.7 feet and a chord bearing 
South 79°51' East); thence along said curve 87.2 feet; thence 
North 89 ° 716f East 266.2 feet along an existing fence to the 
corner; thence South 0°12f East 502.3 feet along the existing 
fence and West line of the County Road known as Spring Creek Road 
to the point of beginning. 
Containing 10.00 Acres 
Together with a 60-foot wide right-of-way described as 
follows: 
A part of-the North half of Section 19, Township 7 
North, Range 1 East Salt Lake Base and Meridian, U.S. Survey: 
Beginning at an existing fence corner 725-1 feet North 
and 21.8 feet West of the Southeast corner of the Southwest 
Quarter of the Northeast Quarter of said Section 19; and running 
thence North 89° ^ 0f West 869.28 feet; thence North 0°12! West 60 
feet; thence South 89°'*0' East 869.28 feet to the existing fence; 
thence South 0°12f East 60 feet along said fence to the point of 
beginning. 
A part of the North Half of Section _,, 
North, Range 1 West, Salt lake Base and Meridian, U.S. Survey 
Beginning at a point 785.10 feet North and 891.08 feet 
North 89o/t0' West from the Southeast Corner-of the Southwest 
Quarter of the Northeast Quarter of said Section 19, running 
thence North 89°40» West 2*»3-01 feet; thence North 0°12' West 
'173.95 feet; thence North 87°17t East 2*13-24 feet; thence South 
0°12! East 486.88 feet to the point of beginning. 
Contains 2.68 Acres 
Together with a 60 foot wide right-of-way described as 
19 Township 7 
follows: Beginning at a point 785. 10 
North 89°40f West from the Southeast 
Quarter of the Northeast Quarter of 
thence South 0°12f East 60.00 feet; 
1112.29 feet; thence North 0°12f West 
89o/40r East 1112.29 feet to the point of beginning, 
feet North and 21.8 feet 
Corner of the Southwest 
said Section 19; running 
thence North 89°40' West 
60.00 feet; thence South 
Together 
of Chicken Creek. 
with 3/16 of the waters or water rights to or 
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2. Said property remains in the name of the Western 
Railroad Builder's Defined Benefit Pension Plan, David L. Durbano, 
Trustee and is subject,to the indebtedness owed by said entity to 
the Plaintiff, Susan ft. White, who has the right to execute 
against said property to satisfy her judgment pursuant to State 
law. 
3. Neither party are awarded any attorney's fees. 
4. Costs shall be awarded to the Plaintiff. 
DATED this day of January, 1994. 
W. BRENT WEST 
District Court Judge 
NOTICE TO COUNSEL 
TO: DEFENDANT AND ITS COUNSEL: 
You will please take notice that the undersigned 
attorney for Plaintiff will submit the foregoing Judgment to W. 
Brent West for his signature upon the expiration of five (5) days 
from the date this notice is mailed to you, allowing three (3) 
days for mailing, unless written objection is filed prior to that 
time, pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration 1988. Kindly govern yourself accordingly. 
DATED this ~? day of January, 1994. 
ROBERT A. ECHARD 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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ROBERT A. ECHARD, 953 
ROBERT ECHARD & ASSOCIATES 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Key Bank Building, Suite 200 
2'-I91 Washington Boulevard 
Ogden, Utah 8'HlOl 
Telephone: 801-393-2399 
Telecopier: 801-393-23*10 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
SUSAN WHITE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
THE WYOMING & COLORADO RAIL, 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 910912250CV 
The above-entitled matter came on for hearing before the 
Honorable Brent West on the 29 th day of October, 1993- The 
Plaintiff was present in court represented by her attorney, Robert 
A. Echard. The Defendant was present in court represented by its 
attorney Douglas Durbano, The court having received evidence in 
the form of testimony and exhibits and having heard arguments from 
the parties and being fully informed in the premises, now 
therefore makes the following Judgment: 
JUDGMENT 
1. The purported transfer of 12.68 acres of land from 
the Western Railroad Builder's Defined Benefit Pension Plan, David 
L. Durbano Trustee, to the Wyoming and Colorado Railroad Company 
Inc. , purportedly made pursuant to a trust deed and a deed in lieu 
of foreclosure, both of which were recorded on May 18, 1990 is 
declared void and is hereby avoided, set aside and/or nullified. 
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Said real property is more particularly described as follows: 
Range 
North 
A part of the North half of Section 19, Township 7 North, 
1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, U.S. Survey: 
Beginning at a point in an existing fence being 60 feet 
0°12! West along said fence from an existing fence corner, 
being 725.1 feet North and 21.8 feet West of the Southeast corner 
of the Southwest Quarter of the Northeast Quarter of said Section 
19, and running thence North 89o/40f West 869-28 feet; thence North 
o°12' West '186.88 feet; thence North 87°17' East 518.23 feet to 
a point on the Westerly right-of-way curve of the County Road 
(said curve having a radius of 2*10.7 feet and a chord bearing 
South 79 ° 51f East); thence along said curve 87.2 feet; thence 
North 8 9 ° zl 6f East 266.2 feet along an existing fence to the 
corner; thence South 0°12' East 502.3 feet along the existing 
fence and West line of the County Road known as Spring Creek Road 
to the point of beginning. 
Containing 10.00 Acres 
Together with a 60-foot wide right-of-way described as 
follows: 
A part of the North half of Section 19, Township 7 North, 
Range 1 East Salt Lake Base and Meridian, U.S. Survey: 
Beginning at*an existing fence corner 725.1 feet North and 
21.8 feet West of the Southeast corner of the Southwest Quarter 
of the Northeast Quarter of said Section 19; and running thence 
North 89o/40f West 869.28 feet; thence North 0o12! West 60 feet; 
thence South 89 ° ZI0' East 869.28 feet to the existing fence; thence 
South 0°12' East 60 feet along said fence to the point of 
beg inning. 
A part of the North Half of Section 19, Township 7 North, 
Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, U.S. Survey: 
Beginning at a point 785-10 feet North and 891.08 feet 
North 89o/l0f West from the Southeast Corner of the Southwest 
Quarter of the Northeast Quarter of said Section 19, running 
thence North 89°'lO' West 2*13.01 feet; thence North 0°12! West 
'J 73.95 feet; thence North 87°17' East 2*13.2*1 feet; thence South 
0°12f East 486.88 feet to the point of beginning. 
Contains 2.68 Acres 
Together with a 60 foot wide right-of-way described as 
follows.- Beginning at a point 785.10 feet North and 21.8 feet 
Corner of the Southwest 
said Section 19; running 
thence North 89°40f West 
60.00 feet; thence South 
North 89°ii01 West from the Southeast 
Quarter of the Northeast Quarter of 
thence South 0°12' East 60.00 feet; 
1112.29 feet; thence North 0°12f West 
89o/l0f East 1112.29 feet to the point of beginning, 
Together with 3/16 of the waters or water rights to or of 
Chicken Creek. 
2. Said property remains in the name of the Western 
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Railroad Builder's Defined Benefit Pension Plan, David L. Durbano, 
Trustee and is subject to the indebtedness owed by said entity to 
the Plaintiff, Susan H. White, who has the right to execute 
against said property to satisfy her judgment pursuant to State 
law. 
3. Neither party are awarded any attorney's fees. 
l\. Costs shall be awarded to the Plaintiff. 
DATED this day of January, 1994. 
W. BRENT WEST 
District Court Judge 
NOTICE TO COUNSEL 
TO: DEFENDANT AND ITS COUNSEL: 
You will please take notice that the undersigned attorney for 
Plaintiff will submit the foregoing Judgment to W. Brent West for 
his signature upon the expiration of five (5) days from the date 
this notice is mailed to you, allowing three (3) days for mailing, 
unless written objection is filed prior to that time, pursuant to 
Rule 4~50>l of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration 1988. 
Kindly govern yourself accordingly. 
DATED this ] day of January, 1994. 
^ Q ^ t ^ 
ROBERT A. ECHARD 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SUSAN H. KEMP, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WESTERN RAILROAD BUILDERS, 
Defendant. 
* 
DAVID E. ROTH, Judge 
Case No. 1694-88 
Date: 10/11/88 
James N. Jones, Reporter 
Fran Lund, Court Clerk 
This is the time set for motions. 
Robert Echard, Esq., appearing as Counsel for t 
plaintiff; plaintiff appearing in person. 
Jeffrey Noland, Esq., appearing on behalf of t 
defendant; 
Issues presented by Counsel. 
Parties are ordered not to dispose of property. 
October 31, 1988 trial date is to be reserved. 
Continue the case to October 12, 1988 at 9:00 am. 
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CHAPTER 6 
UNIFORM FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT 
Section 
25-6-1. 
25-6-2. 
25-6-3. 
25-6-4. 
25-6-5. 
25-6-6. 
25-6-7. 
25-6-8. 
25-6-9. 
25-6-10. 
25-6-11. 
25-6-12. 
25-6-13. 
Short title. 
Definitions. 
Insolvency. 
Value — Transfer. 
Fraudulent transfer — Claim arising be-
fore or after transfer. 
Fraudulent transfer — Claim arising be-
fore transfer. 
Transfer — When made. 
Remedies of creditors. 
Good faith transfer. 
Claim for relief — Time limits. 
Legal principles applicable to chapter. 
Construction of chapter. 
Applicability of chapter. 
25-6-1. Short title. 
This chapter is known as the "Uniform Fraudulent 
Transfer Act." 1988 
25-6-2. Definitions. 
In this chapter: 
(1) "Affiliate" means: 
(a) a person who directly or indirectly 
owns, controls, or holds with power to vote, 
20% or more of the outstanding voting secu-
rities of the debtor, other than a person who 
holds the securities: 
(i) as a fiduciary or agent without sole 
discretionary power to vote the securi-
ties; or 
(ii) solely to secure a debt, if the per-
son has not exercised the power to vote; 
(b) a corporation 207c or more of whose 
outstanding voting securities are directly or 
indirectly owned, controlled, or held with 
power to vote, by the debtor or a person who 
directly or indirectly owns, controls, or holds, 
with power to vote, 209c or more of the out-
standing voting securities of the debtor, 
other than a person who holds the securities: 
(i) as a fiduciary or agent without sole 
power to vote the securities; or 
(ii) solely to secure a debt, if the per-
son has not exercised the power to vote; 
(c) a person whose business is operated by 
the debtor under a lease or other agreement, 
or a person substantially all of whose assets 
are controlled by the debtor; or 
(d) a person who operates the debtor's 
business under a lease or other agreement or 
controls substantially all of the debtor's as-
sets. 
(2) "Asset" means property of a debtor, but 
does not include: 
(a) property to the extent it is encumbered 
by a valid lien; 
(b) property to the extent it is generally 
exempt under nonbankruptcy law; or 
(c) an interest in property held in tenancy 
by the entireties to the extent it is not sub-
ject to process by a creditor holding a claim 
against only one tenant. 
(3) "Claim" means a right to payment, 
whether or not the right is reduced to judgment, 
J^uidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, ma-
lUred, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, 
C i t a b l e , secured, or unsecured. 
(4) "Creditor" means a person who has a claim. 
(5) "Debt" means liability on a claim. 
(6) "Debtor" means a person who is liable on a 
claim. 
(7) "Insider" includes: 
(a) if the debtor is an individual: 
(i) a relative of the debtor or of a gen-
eral partner of the debtor; 
(ii) a partnership in which the debtor 
is a general partner; 
(iii) a general partner in a partner-
ship described in Subsection (7)(a)(ii); 
(iv) a corporation of which the debtor 
is a director, officer, or person in control; 
or 
(v) a limited liability company of 
which the debtor is a member or man-
ager; 
(b) if the debtor is a corporation: 
(i) a director of the debtor; 
(ii) an officer of the debtor; 
(iii) a person in control of the debtor; 
(iv) a partnership in which the debtor 
is a general partner. 
(v) a general partner in a partnership 
described in Subsection (7)(b)(iv); 
(vi) a limited liability company of 
which the debtor is a member or man-
ager; or 
(vii) a relative of a general partner, 
director, officer, or person in control of 
the debtor; 
(c) if the debtor is a partnership: 
(i) a general partner in the debtor; 
(ii) a relative of a general partner in, 
a general partner of, or a person in con-
trol of the debtor; 
(iii) another partnership in which the 
debtor is a general partner; 
(iv) a general partner in a partner-
ship" described in Subsection (7)(c)(iii); 
(v) a limited liability company of 
which the debtor is a member or man-
ager; or 
(vi) a person in control of the debtor; 
(d) if the debtor is a limited liability com-
pany: 
(i) a member or manager of the 
debtor; 
(ii) another limited liability company 
in which the debtor is a member or man-
ager; 
(iii) a partnership in which the debtor 
is a general partner; 
(iv) a general partner in a partner-
ship described in Subsection (7)(d)(iii); 
(v) a person in control of the debtor; or 
(vi) a relative of a general partner, 
member, manager, or person in control 
of the debtor; 
(ej an affiliate, or an insider of an affiliate 
as if the affiliate were the debtor; and 
(f) a managing agent of the debtor. 
(8) "Lien" means a charge against or an inter-
est in property to secure payment of a debt or 
performance of an obligation, and includes a se-
curity interest created by agreement, a judicial 
hen obtained by legal or equitable process or pro-
ceedings, a common-law hen. or a statutory lien. 
(9) "Person" means an individual, partnership, 
limited liability company, corporation, associa-
tion, organization, government or governmental 
25-6-3 FRAUD 
subdivision or agency, business trust, estate, 
trust, or any other legal or commercial entity. 
(10) "Property" means anything that may be 
i l D "Relau.e means an individual or aft in-
dividual related to a spouse, related by consan-
guinity within the third degree as determined by 
the common law, or a spouse, and includes an 
individual in an adoptive relationship withift the 
third degree. 
(12) "Transfer" mean's every mode, direct or 
indirect, absolute or conditional, or voluntary or 
involuntary, of disposing of or parting with an 
asset or an interest in an asset, and includes pay-
ment of money, release, lease, and creation of a 
hen or other encumbrance. 
(13) "Valid hen" means a lien that is effective 
against the holder of a judicial lien subsequently 
obtained by legal or equitable process or proceed-
ings. 1992 
25-6-3. Insolvency. 
( D A debtor is insolvent if the sum of the debtor's 
debts is gTeater than all of the debtor's assets at a fair 
valuation. 
(2) A debtor who is generally not paying his debts 
as they become due is presumed to be insolvent. 
(3) A partnership is insolvent under Subsection (1) 
if the sum of the partnership's debts is greater than 
the aggregate, at a fair variation, of aYi of the part-
nership's assets and the sum of the excess of the value 
of each general partner's nonpartnership assets over 
the partner's nonpartnership debts. 
(4) Assets under this section do not include prop-
erty that has been transferred, concealed, or removed 
with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors or 
that has been transferred in a manner making the 
transfer voidable under this chapter. 
(5) Debts under this section do not include an obli-
gation to the extent it is secured by a valid lien on 
property of the debtor not included as an asset. 1988 
25-6-4. Value — Transfer . 
(D Value is given for a transfer or an obligation if, 
in exchange for the transfer or obligation, property is 
transferred or an antecedent debt is secured or satis-
fied. However, value does not include an unperformed 
promise made other than in the ordinary course of the 
promisor's business to furnish support to the debtor 
or another person. 
(2) Under Subsection 25-6-5(l)(b) and Section 
25-6-6. a person gives a reasonably equivalent value 
if the person acquires an interest of the debtor in an 
asset pursuant to a regularly conducted, noncollusive 
foreclosure sale or execution of a power of sale for the 
acquisition or disposition of the interest of the de~btor 
upon default under a mortgage, deed of trust, or secu-
rity agreement. 
(3) A transfer is made for present value if the ex-
change between the debtor and the transferee is in-
tended by them to be contemporaneous and is in fact 
substantially contemporaneous. 1988 
25-6-5. F r a u d u l e n t t ransfe r — Claim ar i s ing be-
fore o r after t ransfer , 
( D A transfer made or obligation incurred by a 
debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor, whether the 
creditor's claim arose before or after the transfer was 
made or the obligation was incurred, if the debtor 
made the transfer or incurred the obligation: 
(a) with actual intent to hinder, delay, or de-
fraud any creditor of the debtor; or 
(b) without receiving a reasonably eon 
value in exchange for the transfer or obli " i S ^ 
and the debtor- g a t l * : 
(n was en^a&ed or was about <#>
 %Tlg . 
a business or a transaction for which tV» 3 ? 
maining assets of the debtor were unre " ^ 
ably small in relation to the business*^ 
transaction: or " o r 
(ii) intended to incur, or believed or n*^ 
sonably should have believed that he wouW 
incur, debts beyond his ability to pay as th 
became due. ^ 
12) To determine "actual intent" under Subsection 
<D(a), consideration may be given, among other faS 
tors, to whether: 
(a) the transfer or obligation was to an insider 
(b) the debtor retained possession or control of 
the property transferred after the transfer \-» 
(c) the transfer or obligation was disclosed or 
concealed; 
(d) before the transfer was made or obligation 
was incurred, the debtor had been sued or threat-
ened with suit; 
(e) the transfer was of substantially all the 
debtor's assets; 
(0 the debtor absconded; 
(g) the debtor removed or concealed assets; 
(h) the value of the consideration received by 
the debtor was reasonably equivalent to the 
value of the asset transferred or the amount of 
the obligation incurred; 
(i) the debtor was insolvent or became insol-
vent shortly after the transfer was made or the 
obligation was incurred; 
(j) the transfer occurred shortly before or 
shortly after a substantial debt was incurred; and 
(k) the debtor transferred the essential assets 
of the business to a lienor who transferred the 
assets to an insider of the debtor. 1988 
25-6-6. F r a u d u l e n t t r ans fe r — Claim arising be-
fore t ransfer . 
( D A transfer made or obligation incurred by a 
debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor whose claim 
arose before the transfer was made or the obligation 
was incurred if: 
(a) the debtor made the transfer or incurred 
the obligation without receiving a reasonably 
equivalent value in exchange for the transfer or 
obligation; and 
(b) the debtor was insolvent at the time or be-
came insolvent as a result of the transfer or obli-
gation. 
(2) A transfer made by a debtor is fraudulent as to 
2i tTfe&ltOT ^Ylt)S>fe tY&Ym ?t?OS>£ WtOYfe tYlfc VT*W?&feT w a S 
made if the transfer was made to an insider for an 
antecedent debt, the debtor was insolvent at the time, 
and the insider had reasonable cause to believe that 
the debtor was insolvent. 1 9^ 
25-6-7. T r a n s f e r — When m a d e . 
In this chapter: 
( D A transfer is made: 
(a) with respect to an asset that is real 
property other than a fixture, but including 
the interest of a seller or purchaser under a 
contract for the sale of the asset, when the 
transfer is so far perfected that a g°°^"ff[J^ 
purchaser of the asset from the d e b t T 
against whom applicable law permits 
transfer to be perfected cannot acquire a 
D 
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interest in the asset that is superior to the 
interest of the transferee; and 
(b) with respect to an asset that is not real 
property or that is a fixture, when the trans-
fer is so far perfected that a creditor on a 
simple contract cannot acquire a judicial lien 
other than under this chapter that is supe-
rior to the interest of the transferee. 
(2) If applicable law permits the transfer to be 
perfected as provided in Subsection (1) and the 
transfer is not so perfected before the commence-
ment of an action for relief under this chapter, 
the transfer is deemed made immediately before 
the commencement of the action. 
(3) If applicable law does not permit the trans-
fer to be perfected as provided in Subsection (1), 
the transfer is made when it becomes effective 
between the debtor and the transferee. 
(4) A transfer is not made until the debtor has 
acquired rights in the asset transferred. 
(5) An obligation is incurred: 
(a) if oral, when it becomes effective be-
tween the parties; or 
(b) if evidenced by a wr i t ing , when t he 
w r i t i n g executed by the obligor is del ivered 
to or for the benefit of the obligee. 1988 
25-6-8. Remedies of creditors. 
(1) In an action for relief against a transfer or obli-
gation under this chapter, a creditor, subject to the 
limitations in Section 25-6-9, may obtain: 
(a) avoidance of the transfer or obligation to 
the extent necessary to satisfy the creditors 
claim; 
(b) an attachment or other provisional remedy 
against the asset transferred or other property of 
the transferee in accordance with the procedure 
prescribed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; 
(c) subject to applicable principles of equity 
and in accordance with applicable rules of civil 
procedure: 
(i) an injunction against further disposi-
tion by the debtor or a transferee, or both, of 
the asset transferred or of other property; 
(ii) appointment of a receiver to take 
charge of the asset transferred or of other 
property of the transferee; or 
(iii) any other relief the circumstances 
may require. 
(2) If a creditor has obtained a judgment on a claim 
against the debtor, the creditor, if the court orders, 
may levy execution on the asset transferred or its 
proceeds. 1988 
25-6-9. Good faith transfer. 
( D A transfer or obligation is not voidable under 
Subsection 25-6-5tl'ia) against a person who took in 
good faith and for a reasonably equivalent value or 
against any subsequent transferee or obligee. 
(2) Except as otherwise provided in this section, to 
the extent a transfer is voidable in an action by a 
creditor under Subsection 25-6-8(1 ha), the creditor 
may recover judgment for the value of the asset 
transferred, as adjusted under Subsection (3), or the 
amount necessary to satisfy the creditor's claim, 
whichever is less. The judgment may be entered 
against: 
(a) the first transferee of the asset or the per-
son for whose benefit the transfer was made; or 
(b) any subsequent transferee other than a 
good faith transferee who took for value or from 
any subsequent transferee. 
(3) If the judgment under Subsection (2) is based 
upon the value of the asset transferred, the judgment 
must be for an amount equal to the value of the asset 
at the time of the transfer, subject to an adjustment 
as equities may require. 
(4) Notwithstanding.voidability of a transfer or an 
obligation under this chapter, a good-faith transferee 
or obligee is entitled, to the extent of the value given 
the debtor for the transfer or obligation, to: 
(a) a Hen on or a right to retain any interest in 
the asset transferred; 
(b) enforcement of any obligation incurred; or 
(c) a reduction in the amount of the liability on 
the judgment. 
(5) A transfer is not voidable under Subsection 
25-6-5(1 )(b) or Section 25-6-6 if the transfer results 
from: 
(a) termination of a lease upon default by the 
debtor when the termination is pursuant to the 
lease and applicable law; or 
(b) enforcement of a security interest in com-
pliance with Tide 70A, Chapter 9, the Uniform 
Commercial Code. 
(6) A transfer is not voidable under Subsection 
25-6-6(2): 
(a) to the extent the insider gave new value to 
or for the benefit of the debtor after the transfer 
was made unless the new value was secured by a 
valid lien; 
(b) if made in the ordinary course of business 
or financial affairs of the debtor and the insider; 
or 
(c) if made pursuant to a good-faith effort to 
rehabilitate the debtor and the transfer secured 
present value given for that purpose as well as an 
antecedent debt of the debtor. 1988 
25-6-10. Claim for relief — Time limits. 
A claim for relief or cause of action regarding a 
fraudulent transfer or obligation under this chapter 
is extinguished "unless action is brought: 
(1) under Subsection 25-6-5(1 Ka), within four 
years after the transfer was made or the obliga-
tion was incurred or, if later, within one year 
after the transfer or obligation was or could rea-
sonably have been discovered by the claimant; 
(2) under Subsection 25-6-5(l)(b) or 25-6-6(1), 
within four years after the transfer was made or 
the obligation was incurred; or 
(3) under Subsection 25-6-6(2), within one 
year after the transfer was made or the obliga-
tion was incurred. 1988 
25-6-11. Legal principles applicable to chapter. 
Unless displaced by this chapter, the principles of 
law and equity, including merchant law and the law 
relating to principal and agent, equitable subordina-
tion, estoppel, laches, fraud, misrepresentation, du-
ress, coercion, mistake, insolvency, or other validat-
ing or invalidating cause, supplement this chapter's 
provisions. 1988 
25-6-12. Construction of chapter. 
This chapter shall be applied and construed to ef-
fectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law 
with respect to the subject of this chapter among 
states enacting it. 1988 
25-6-13. Applicability of chapter. 
This act applies when any transfer occurs after the 
effective date of this act. 1988 
